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Abstract
In this paper we argue that the surge in world trade over the two decades preceding the global
downturn of 2008-09 can be partly explained by the export-magnification effect of offshoring.
In a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms we show analytically that a fall in
variable offshoring costs boosts trade in differentiated final goods through an intra-industry
reallocation of resources towards the more productive firms. More specifically, lower barriers
to offshoring reduce the input costs of incumbent offshoring firms and allow more firms to
source cheap foreign intermediates, which improves firm-level price competitiveness. This,
in turn, translates into higher export quantities of incumbent exporters (intensive margin)
and entry of new exporters (extensive margin), thereby fostering trade in final goods.
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1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen globalization proceed at an ever finer level of resolution.
Production is increasingly sliced up into separate tasks that can be traded internationally
(Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2008b). As a result, more and more firms are engaged in off-
shoring: They either import intermediates from offshore affiliates or purchase foreign inter-
mediates at arm’s length. This "high-resolution globalisation" (Baldwin 2006, Baldwin 2008)
has been paralleled by a surge in world trade: the global trade-to-GDP ratio almost doubled
between the mid-1980s and 2008, from 14% to 27%. Although the ratio dropped sharply in the
wake of the global downturn of 2008-09, it rebounded thereafter.
In this paper, we propose a novel mechanism linking the rise of offshoring and the intensi-
fication of world trade, based on a model with heterogeneous firms. We show analytically that
a fall in offshoring costs boosts trade in differentiated final goods through an intra-industry
reallocation of resources towards the more productive firms - the export- magnification effect
of offshoring. In a nutshell, lower barriers to offshoring allow more domestic firms to source
cheap foreign intermediates and reduce the input costs of incumbent offshoring firms, which
improves firm-level competitiveness. This, in turn, translates into higher export quantities of
incumbent exporters (intensive margin) and the entry of new exporters (extensive margin),
thereby fostering trade in final goods.
Our analysis rests on a three-sector multi-country general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous firms in the vein of Melitz (2003). There are many symmetric advanced economies
and a "workbench country" (think of China or the CEECs). Ricardian comparative advantages
determine the equilibrium trade patterns: the advanced economies import cheap interme-
diates from the workbench country in return for a homogeneous consumption good. At the
same time, they trade differentiated products among each other to satisfy consumers’ love of
variety.
Crucially, each firm in the differentiated good sector is free to decide not only whether to
export or not (export decision) but also whether to purchase intermediates at home or abroad
(offshoring decision). Both exporting and offshoring is subject to variable and fixed costs.
Therefore, only the larger, more productive firms engage in offshoring: the cost reductions
generated by offshoring are proportional to the amount of intermediates used, whereas the
fixed costs are identical for all firms. Likewise, only the most productive firms simultaneously
engage in both offshoring and exporting. This self-selection of firms into exporting and sourc-
ing modes is indeed broadly consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Amiti & Konings 2007,
Bernard, Jensen & Schott 2005, Kugler & Verhoogen 2009, Muuls & Pisu 2009, Tomiura 2007).
Having described the equilibrium with trade in final goods and offshoring, we analyze an-
alytically the consequences of closer integration of the workbench country into the global
economy - modeled as a fall in variable offshoring costs. Not surprisingly, inter-industry trade
in homogeneous intermediate and final goods intensifies. More remarkably, given that trade
costs in differentiated final goods have remained unchanged, closer integration of interme-
diate goods markets also boosts exports of final goods at both the intensive and extensive
margin. Access to cheaper intermediates from abroad allows highly productive firms to in-
crease their export quantities and additional firms manage to become exporters. The ensuing
reallocation of resources toward the more productive firms raises the average firm efficiency
in the differentiated final good sector. This, in turn, lowers the consumption price level and
raises real wages, thereby leading to a long-run welfare gain. However, the associated ad-
justments involve a significant reallocation of labor both between and within sectors. Such
an adjustment process is likely to be painful in the presence of frictions in labor and goods
markets.
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Of course, we claim no originality for the idea that offshoring may partly account for the
surge in world trade. That said, the mechanism proposed in this paper differs considerably
from those in the existing theoretical literature. Most prominently, Yi (2003) demonstrated
that vertical specialization can magnify the trade response to changes in tariffs and lead to
non-linearity, which helps explain the striking growth in world trade. His theoretical analysis
is based on a homogeneous firm model and focuses exclusively on trade in intermediates.
By contrast, we build a model with heterogeneous firms in which intra-industry reallocation
in response to lower offshoring costs can generate an increase in final goods trade, over and
above the intensification in intermediates trade. This distinction is relevant, because available
evidence suggests that higher intermediates trade can only partly explain the striking growth
in total world trade. In the euro area, for instance, trade in intermediates actually increased
by less than trade in final goods on both the import and export side in the 2000s (see Charts 1
and 2).
Notably, the export-magnification effect of offshoring does not rely on statistical artefacts
related to the measurement of trade. Economists have long argued that trade in intermedi-
ates is a natural by-product of offshoring, as the various fragments have to be shipped across
borders. With trade flows reported in values rather than value added, offshoring will result in
higher trade in steady state compared with a situation without vertical fragmentation. While
this approach is contingent on the measurement of trade, our paper provides a purely "eco-
nomic" explanation grounded in the profit maximizing behavior of individual firms.
Finally, our paper is related to an extensive offshoring literature. Our concept of offshoring
is in the tradition of the theory of international fragmentation (e.g. Deardorff 1998, Deardorff
2001, Jones 2000, Kohler 2004). Hence, the profitability of offshoring solely depends on the
interplay of comparative advantages and offshoring costs. We exclude all imperfections in
contracting and matching that feature so prominently in other approaches to offshoring (e.g.
Antràs 2003, Feenstra & Hanson 2005, Grossman & Helpman 2005).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoret-
ical framework. We focus on the main idea and relegate much of the formal analysis to the
appendix. In Section 3, we study the effects of lower offshoring costs on individual firms and
the overall economy. This is complemented by other comparative statics, including the effects
of lower export costs. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we develop the theoretical framework underlying our analysis. The world con-
sists of n + 1 perfectly symmetric countries ("advanced economies") and another country,
called the "workbench" (W ). The domestic economy belongs to the advanced countries and
hosts three sectors (and so do the other n advanced economies). In the first sector (Y ), a ho-
mogenous final good is produced under perfect competition. This homogenous good is con-
sumed by households and traded without any costs between countries. Firms in the second
sector (I) produce a homogeneous intermediate good under perfect competition. In the third
sector (X), firms combine labor and the intermediate good to produce a differentiated con-
sumption good. This good is traded only between advanced economies to satisfy consumers’
love of variety. The sole factor of production, labor, is mobile between sectors but not between
countries. Hence there is a single wage rate w in each country. However, labor productivity
may vary across sectors.
Country W is not directly involved in producing or trading the differentiated final good.
Its main purpose is to serve as a supplier of intermediate goods to the other countries. In
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essence, this separation allows us to maintain the assumption that all countries trading the
differentiated final good are symmetric.
Final good producers in the differentiated good sector differ in terms of productivity in the
vein of Melitz (2003). Furthermore, they can purchase intermediates either from domestic or
from foreign suppliers. In the last case, we speak of offshoring. Crucially, the price of interme-
diates from country W is lower than the price of domestic ones. The lower price results from
the Ricardian comparative advantage in the production of intermediates (relative to produc-
tion of the homogeneous final good) that W enjoys by assumption. However, offshoring is
associated with fixed costs. Think of the resources necessary to establish an office overseas
for coordination purposes. The existence of fixed offshoring costs triggers self-selection of
firms into sourcing modes. Only firms with high productivity manage to take benefit of cheap
foreign intermediates, because they can bear the burden of higher fixed costs.
While, in our model, trade in intermediates is at arm’s length, it would be straightforward
to write the model in terms of intra-firm trade, without any change in the main findings.
2.1 Households
Households in all advanced economies have identical preferences. In the following, we only
describe the home country. Unless stated otherwise, the other countries go through analo-
gously.
The representative household has Cobb-Douglas preferences over the homogenous final
good, Y , and the bundle of differentiated goods, X:
U = XβY 1−β (0 < β < 1). (1)
The X-bundle, in turn, is a CES aggregator over the mass of available varieties, which is en-
dogenous and denoted by Ω:
X =
[∫
ω∈Ω
x(ω)ρ dω
] 1
ρ
. (2)
Here, x(ω) is consumption of a single varietyω ∈ Ω. Varieties are substitutes with ρ ≡ (σ−1)/σ.
We assume σ > 1.
The price index of the differentiate good PX is then given by
PX =
[∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdk
]1/(1−σ)
. (3)
Here, p(ω) is the consumer price of variety ω.
Total expenditures, E, are made up of expenditures on good X and Y : E = EX + EY .
Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that consumers spend a constant expenditure share β on the
differentiated good. Expenditure on a single variety ω is given by: e(ω) = (p(ω)/PX)
1−σ
EX .
2.2 The homogeneous goods sectors
Each advanced economy hosts three sectors. Two of them are characterized by perfect com-
petition between producers of homogeneous goods: the final good Y and the intermediate
good I. Here, labor is the only input for production. Labor productivity, denoted by ϕY and
ϕI respectively, differs across industries, but is the same for all firms within each industry.
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Since labor is mobile between sectors, there is a unique domestic wage rate w. The same is
true for the other countries. Sector Y ’s raison d’être is to pin down these wage rates.
Both homogeneous goods sectors are characterized by a production technology that is
linear in labor:
Y = ϕY LY (4)
I = ϕILI . (5)
The workbench country also produces both types of homogeneous goods. Sector-specific
labor productivity in the workbench country, denoted by ϕwY and ϕ
w
I , differs from that in the
advanced economies. In the following, we assume that all countries (including W ) have a
positive output of both Y and I. Hence there is no complete specialization.
We choose good Y as the numeraire and set pY = 1. Perfect competition implies pY =
1 = w/ϕY and pwY = w
w/ϕwY . Notice that superscript w stands for country W . Since good
Y is traded without costs between countries, prices are equalized: pY = pwY = 1. This pins
down the wage rates: w = ϕY and ww = ϕwY . As the intermediate good sector is also perfectly
competitive, factory prices are determined as
pdI =
w
ϕI
=
ϕY
ϕI
, pwI =
ww
ϕwI
=
ϕwY
ϕwI
. (6)
Trade in intermediates involves variable distance costs τI (with τI > 1). Assuming iceberg
costs, the c.i.f. price of the foreign intermediate good is poffI = τIp
w
I . If the c.i.f. price of foreign
intermediates were higher than the price of domestic intermediates, no domestic firm would
find it profitable to source intermediates from abroad. Therefore, the following assumption is
critical:
Assumption A1
The c.i.f. price of foreign intermediates, poffI , is lower than the price of domestic intermedi-
ates, pdI . Put differently, Foreign’s comparative advantage in the production of good I (relative
to production of good Y ) is large enough to make up for the distance costs τI :
ϕY /ϕ
w
Y
ϕI/ϕwI
> τI > 1 ⇔ p
off
I
pdI
< 1.

This assumption on comparative advantages determines the equilibrium pattern of trade.
The advanced economies import intermediate goods from the workbench country and export
the homogeneous final good Y to the same country. Furthermore, they trade the differenti-
ated final goods with each other. Although the advanced economies do not trade good Y
among each other, they share the same price pY = 1 as they all trade Y freely with W .
2.3 Differentiated good producers
In the X sector heterogeneous firms produce a differentiated final good under Dixit-Stiglitz-
type monopolistic competition. Production requires domestic labor and the intermediate
good. The production technology is of Cobb-Douglas type, with α representing the impor-
tance of the intermediate input (0 < α < 1).
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Crucially, firms differ in their productivity ϕ drawn at entry from a common distribution
g(ϕ), as in Melitz (2003).1 Furthermore, firms are free to source their intermediates either from
domestic or foreign suppliers. Hence the second key element determining a firm’s production
costs, apart from its productivity draw ϕ, is the price pkI it pays for intermediate inputs (with
k = (d, off)):
pkI =
{
pdI if the firm sources domestic intermediates
poffI if the firm sources foreign intermediates.
(7)
For convenience, we define a summary measure - called firm efficiency - that combines
a firm’s productivity level ϕ and its unit cost of intermediate inputs: φk = ϕ/(pkI )
α. As will
become obvious, the optimal sourcing decision and therefore the firm-specific sourcing cost
of intermediates depend on firm productivity: pkI = p
k
I (ϕ). More specifically, more productive
firms will opt for foreign intermediates, whereas less productive firms will have to content
themselves with domestic ones. (Below, we will describe the conditions under which this
partitioning of firms holds.) This implies that firm efficiency is itself a function of the firm’s
productivity level. For the sake of simplicity, firms will be indexed by φk, bearing in mind that
the firm efficiency is ultimately determined by firm-specific productivity.
Since the production technology is of Cobb-Douglas type, variable costs are given by c(φk) =
w1−α/φk. In this monopolistic competitive setting, every firm sets its price p(φk) optimally by
multiplying its marginal costs with a fixed mark-up factor of 1/ρ. Hence revenues from do-
mestic sales are given by
rH(φk) =
[
w1−α
ρφk
]1−σ
EX
P 1−σX
. (8)
Production of the final good requires fixed overhead costs fp in terms of labor. Hence, if a
firm sources its intermediates domestically (k = d), its profits from sales at home are given by
piH(φd) =
rH(φd)
σ
− fpw. (9)
If a firm purchases foreign intermediates (k = off )), it faces additional fixed costs of off-
shoring, fI . Its profits can then be written as
piH(φoff ) =
rH(φoff )
σ
− (fp + fI)w. (10)
In both cases, profits rise with firm efficiency φk and aggregate demand, whereas they depend
negatively on the domestic wage rate and fixed costs.
Firms whose productivity is too low to recoup the fixed costs fp have to leave the market
immediately after drawing their productivity. Let the minimum productivity a firm must have
drawn to survive be denoted by ϕ̂min. Firms with productivityϕ = ϕ̂min will make zero profits,
which yields:
ϕ̂min =
w1−α
(
pdI
)α
ρPX
(
σfpw
EX
) 1
σ−1
. (11)
1We assume that the (σ − 1)th uncentered moment of g(ϕ) is finite. This will ensure that the productivity of the
average firm is finite.
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Notice that rH(φd(ϕ̂min)) = σfpw. Also, recall that we take as given that the marginal firm
entering the market neither exports nor engages in offshoring. Hence it is possible to derive
the minimum efficiency: φ̂min = ϕ̂min/(pdI)
α.
Every firm is free to source its intermediates from abroad. By assumption (A.1), the price
of foreign intermediates is lower than that of domestic ones. Nevertheless, the least produc-
tive firms cannot afford to engage in offshoring. Since they sell less than their competitors,
the lower variable cost associated with offshoring cannot make up for the fixed cost fI . There-
fore, offshoring is only profitable for firms passing a certain threshold productivity. Let this
productivity level for which a firm is indifferent between domestic sourcing and offshoring be
denoted by ϕ̂off . Then:
ϕ̂off =
(poffI
pdI
)α(1−σ)
− 1
 11−σ w1−α(pdI)α
ρPX
(
σfIw
EX
) 1
σ−1
= ϕ̂min
(
fI
fp
) 1
σ−1
(poffI
pdI
)α(1−σ)
− 1
 11−σ .
(12)
Again, deriving the corresponding firm efficiency is straightforward: φ̂off = ϕ̂off/(p
off
I )
α.
As already indicated, we assume that only the most productive firms find it profitable to
export. In addition to fp and fI , they have to bear the fixed cost of exporting, fex. At the same
time, however, these firms are able to lift their sales by serving foreign consumers. Recall that
country H trades the differentiated good only with the n symmetric advanced economies.
Owing to the symmetry assumption, a firm will either serve all n export markets or none at all.
Total profits are therefore given by:
pi(φoff ) = piH(φoff ) + npiF (φoff ) =
(
1 + nτ1−σ
)
rH(φoff )/σ − (fp + fI + nfex)w. (13)
Here, τ denotes iceberg trade costs associated with the final good (τ > 1).
The cutoff productivity level ϕ̂ex,off for which an offshoring firm is indifferent between
exporting and non-exporting is defined by:
ϕ̂ex,off = τ
w1−α(poffI )
α
ρPX
(
σfexw
EX
) 1
σ−1
= ϕ̂min τ
(
fex
fp
) 1
σ−1
(
poffI
pdI
)α
.
(14)
All firms with ϕ > ϕ̂ex,off will be exporters and purchase their intermediates abroad. Notice
that φ̂ex,off = ϕ̂ex,off/(p
off
I )
α.
As indicated above, we have taken as given that ϕ̂min < ϕ̂off < ϕ̂ex,off . The following as-
sumptions, together with assumption (A1), ensure that this partitioning of firms indeed holds
true (see also appendix A.1).
Assumption A2
The comparative advantage of the workbench country in producing the intermediate good,
adjusted for distance costs, i.e. τIϕwY ϕI/ϕ
w
I ϕY = p
off
I /p
d
I , is in the interval (min{p˜1, p˜2},max{p˜1, p˜2}),
where
p˜1 ≡
(
fp
fp + fI
) 1
α(σ−1)
, p˜2 ≡
(
1− fI
fexτσ−1
) 1
α(σ−1)
.
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To ensure that the minimum productivity ϕ̂ex,off is larger than minimum productivity ϕ̂off ,
as assumed above, we further need
Assumption A3
p˜2 > p˜1. That requires fp + fI < fexτσ−1.

In essence, the competitive edge of foreign suppliers of intermediates must be large enough
to make offshoring profitable for some domestic firms. At the same time, it cannot be too
large, because otherwise all firms would engage in offshoring.
2.4 Aggregation
In this model, all aggregate variables can be expressed in terms of appropriate industry-level
averages. It is convenient to use weights reflecting the relative output shares of individual
firms. Recall that differences in the relative output shares of two individual firms will be driven
by differences in firm efficiency: x(φ′)/x(φ′′) = (φ′′/φ′)σ. Therefore, cross-firm averages based
on output shares must take into account different input costs (as long as the firms do not
share the same sourcing mode). Against this backdrop, let φ˜ denote the average efficiency
of all domestic firms and φ˜t the average efficiency of all firms active in country H (including
foreign exporters):
φ˜ =
[∫ ∞
0
(
φk(ϕ)
)σ−1
µ(ϕ) dϕ
] 1
σ−1
=
{
1
M
[
Mdφ˜
σ−1
d +Moff φ˜
σ−1
off +Mex,off φ˜
σ−1
ex,off
]} 1σ−1
(15)
φ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mφ˜σ−1 + nMex,off
(
τ−1φ˜ex,off
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
. (16)
Here, µ(ϕ) = g(ϕ)/[1 − G(ϕ̂min)] is the equilibrium productivity distribution. Furthermore,
φ˜d, φ˜off and φ˜ex,off represent the average efficiency of the three groups of domestic firms in
equilibrium (see Appendix A.2). The mass of firms in each group is Md, Moff and Mex,off .
Similarly, M denotes the total mass of domestic firms and Mt the mass of all firms active in
country H . By symmetry, φ˜t is also the average efficiency of all domestic firms, taking into
account the foreign sales of domestic exporters and controlling for transport costs τ .
It is now straightforward to express all aggregate variables as functions of the average effi-
ciency φ˜t:
PX = M
1
1−σ
t p(φ˜t)
RX = MtrH(φ˜t) = Mr(φ˜),
Furthermore, welfare per worker, W , is captured by the real wage rate:
W =
w
P
= wβˆ
[
M
1
1−σ
t p(φ˜t)
]−β
= ϕ̂βminwβˆ
[
ρ
w1−α(pdI)α
]β (
βL
σfp
) β
σ−1
. (17)
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Notice that P = P βXp
1−β
Y /βˆ = P
β
X/βˆ, where βˆ = [β
β(1− β)1−β ].
It is important to realize that domestic welfare rises with the minimum productivity ϕ̂min.
Analogous reasoning applies to the other advanced economies. However, welfare in country
W is fixed at ϕwY , as households inW consume only the numeraire good Y . Since the nominal
wage rate in terms of the numeraire is fixed, so is welfare in country W .
2.5 Open Economy Equilibrium
2.5.1 Differentiated good sector
There are many potential entrants for each sector in all economies. If active firms generate
profits, new entrants arise and compete these profits away. Market entry in the differentiated
good sector is subject to fixed costs fe in terms of labor. Failure must be taken into account, as
paying the fixed costs of entry does not guarantee that the entrant’s productivity draw exceeds
ϕ̂min. Therefore, expected profits are given by νinp¯i, where νin = 1 − G(ϕ̂min) is the ex-ante
probability of successful entry and p¯i = pi(φ˜) is the average profit of all surviving domestic
firms in the X sector. Firms enter as long as expected profits exceed fixed market entry costs
few. This yields the free entry (FE) condition:
p¯i =
few
νin
. (18)
Furthermore, average profits of domestic firms earned at home and abroad, p¯i, can be writ-
ten as:
p¯i = νdpi(φ˜d) + νoffpi(φ˜off ) + νex,offpi(φ˜ex,off ). (19)
Notice that νd, νoff and νex,off stand for the probabilities of belonging to one of the three
equilibrium groups of firms, conditional on successful entry: νd = [G(ϕ̂off ) − G(ϕ̂min)]/[1 −
G(ϕ̂min)], νoff = [G(ϕ̂ex,off ) − G(ϕ̂off )]/[1 − G(ϕ̂min)] and νex,off = [1 − G(ϕ̂ex,off )]/[1 −
G(ϕ̂min)]. Also, recall that average profits are functions of the minimum productivity level
ϕ̂min. Following Melitz (2003), we call equation (19) the zero cutoff profit condition (ZCP).
The ZCP and FE conditions together identify a unique equilibrium, as shown graphically in
Figure 3 and analytically in appendix A.3.
2.5.2 Market clearing
The world market for good X clears if
(n+ 1)EX = (n+ 1)βwL = (n+ 1)RX . (20)
Hence aggregate revenues in the X sector are exogenously fixed: RX = βwL. This implies
that, if PX falls, aggregate output in the differentiated good sector will increase.
For the world Y market to clear, total demand must equal supply. Owing to Cobb-Douglas
preferences, consumers will always spend a fraction (1−β) of their total expenditure on good
Y . Also, consumers in country W spend their entire income on the homogeneous final good.
Thus:
(n+ 1)EY + EwY = (n+ 1)(1− β)wL+ wwLw = (n+ 1)Y + Y w. (21)
Since world demand for good Y is fixed, changes in Y and Y w need to cancel out. Hence an
increase in the supply of good Y in the advanced economies, say, must be compensated by
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a decrease in the supply originating in country W . Then labor market clearing in W requires
that labor shifts to sector I: Lw = LwY + L
w
I . Consequently, W ’s output of intermediates will
increase.
The domestic labor market is in equilibrium if L = LY + LI + LX + Le. Here, Le denotes
labor used by new entrants for investment: Le = Mefe (where Me is the mass of entrants).
Aggregate stability requires that the mass of entrants is just large enough to replace the in-
cumbent firms, taking into account that some entrants will be too weak to stay in the market:
Me = M/[1 − G(ϕ̂min)]. By the FE condition, fe = [1 − G(ϕ̂min)]p¯i/w. Combining the pre-
ceding equations yields: Le = Mp¯i/w. Hence profits in the X sector are fully paid out to the
investment workers, ensuring that total household income equals the wage bill.
The world market for intermediate goods is in equilibrium if the advanced economies’
demand for intermediates equals the world supply of intermediates.
Finally, trade between the advanced economies is always balanced, by the symmetry as-
sumption. Furthermore, recall that country W imports good Y and exports its entire output
of intermediates, pwI I
w. HenceW ’s trade with the group of advanced economies (expressed in
terms of f.o.b. prices) is balanced if pwI I
w = EwY − Y w.
3 The impacts of economic integration
The model presented in the previous section allows us to study the impacts of economic in-
tegration on individual firms, international trade and aggregate welfare. In a first step, we
explore the consequences of lower offshoring costs. In particular, we show that a decline in
variable offshoring costs stimulates trade in differentiated final goods. In a second step, we
briefly look at the impacts of changes in other model parameters. We relegate the formal
analysis to Appendix A.4 and focus on the main ideas.
3.1 Lower variable offshoring costs
Over the last two decades, the "glue" holding together individual production stages in close
geographical proximity has gradually melted (Baldwin 2006). For instance, new forms of telecom-
munication - such as the internet - have facilitated the monitoring and coordination of remote
links of the supply chain. At the same time, political liberalization has reduced artificial bar-
riers to trade in intermediates. In particular, a number of countries - including China and
the CEECs - that lend themselves to produce intermediates for the advanced economies have
been gradually integrated into the world economy. In the model, we capture these develop-
ments with a drop in variable offshoring costs τI . All other exogenous parameters, including
the variable costs of exporting final goods, remain unchanged.
Competition intensifies
What are the impacts of a marginal drop in offshoring costs? The new equilibrium is deter-
mined by the zero-cutoff profit condition (ZCP) and the free entry condition (FE). While the
FE condition in equation (18) remains unaffected by the change in τI , the ZCP condition in
(19) shifts to the right. As a result, the cutoff productivity level in the new equilibrium, ϕ̂′min,
is higher than the one in the previous equilibrium (see Figure 3). (Notice that variables with
a prime correspond to the new equilibrium with lower offshoring costs.) We summarize this
finding as follows:
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Result 1: Competition intensifies
A marginal drop in variable offshoring costs (τI) forces the least productive firms to quit the
domestic market.
This may come as a surprise, because the least productive firms do not engage in off-
shoring (due to the fixed offshoring costs) and, therefore, are not directly affected by changes
in τI . However, they are harmed by an indirect effect stemming from increased competition
in the domestic market. Several mechanisms are at play. To start with, all firms that already
sourced their intermediates from abroad before the drop in τI see their marginal cost fall,
because the c.i.f. price of foreign intermediates decreases. Moreover, lower offshoring costs
render foreign sourcing profitable for more domestic firms, i.e. the cutoff productivity ϕ̂off
falls. Crucially, the decrease in input costs of incumbent and new offshoring firms translates
into lower prices of their varieties. This downward pressure on the aggregate price level PX
stiffens competition in the domestic market. In addition, new foreign exporters enter the
domestic market, intensifying competition further. All these mechanisms contribute to the
extinction of the least productive firms.
The export-magnification effect
We now move on to show that the drop in variable offshoring costs stimulates trade in differ-
entiated final goods. More specifically, we will demonstrate that lower offshoring costs allow
incumbent exporters to increase their export quantities (intensive margin) and enable new
domestic firms to become exporters (extensive margin).
Turning to the extensive margin first, notice that, for a marginal fall in variable offshoring
costs from τI to τ ′I , we have:
ϕ̂′ex,off
ϕ̂ex,off
=
(
τ ′I
τI
)α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
(
ϕ̂′min
ϕ̂min
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
< 1. (22)
The first term on the right-hand side captures the direct effect of lower variable offshoring
costs on incumbent offshoring firms. A drop in τI leads to lower marginal costs and, ceteris
paribus, higher profits from foreign sales. This direct effect makes exporting profitable for
some firms that were previously unable to sell to foreign markets. However, there is also an
indirect effect - captured by the second term on the right-hand side - stemming from the in-
crease in competition. This countervailing effect diminishes the profitability of exporting, be-
cause stiffened competition weighs on market shares. At first sight, it appears that the overall
effect is ambiguous. Yet, one can show analytically that the direct effect will always outweigh
the indirect effect so that the overall effect is positive (see Appendix A.4, equation (A-5)). Thus,
lower variable offshoring costs always lead to a decrease in the export cutoff productivity, al-
lowing additional domestic firms to compete successfully on export markets.2
A reduction in offshoring costs also boosts exports of differentiated final goods through
the intensive margin, i.e. incumbent exporters increase their export quantities. This reflects a
cross-country reallocation of market shares from low-productivity to high-productivity firms.
More specifically, incumbent exporters from country H experience a drop in input costs,
2It should be noted that it is not straightforward to pin down the overall mass of new exporters without restrictions
on the shape of the productivity distribution function. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the change
in the cutoff export productivity as the change in the extensive margin of exports.
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which allows them to sell their variety at a lower price. This, in turn, gives them a com-
petitive edge in foreign markets over local competitors whose productivity is too low to ren-
der offshoring profitable. Notably, price competitiveness vis-à-vis competing exporters from
third countries does not improve. Since the advanced economies are assumed to be perfectly
symmetric, foreign exporters experience the same drop in input costs as the domestic ex-
porters. Thus, the mirror image of higher domestic exports are diminishing sales of foreign
low-productivity firms that neither export nor offshore.
To derive the effect on the intensive margin analytically, notice that, in nominal terms, the
intensive margin of trade corresponds to the revenues from foreign sales. Export revenues
must rise in response to lower offshoring costs, since
r′F (φ
off )
rF (φoff )
=
[(
τ ′I
τI
)α(
ϕ̂′min
ϕ̂min
)]1−σ
> 1. (23)
Here, we have made use of equation (22). A similar expression holds for real exports.
We call the overall effect on trade in final differentiated goods the export-magnification
effect of offshoring :
Result 2: The export-magnification effect of offshoring
A marginal drop in variable offshoring costs (τI) fosters intra-industry trade in differentiated
final goods between the advanced economies through both the intensive and extensive margin
of trade.
The expansion of trade between the advanced economies is non-trivial: In the model, the
advanced economies trade only differentiated final goods with each other and the distance
costs τ associated with this type of international trade have remained unchanged. Thus, the
intensification of final goods trade stems entirely from the resource reallocation between het-
erogeneous firms.
The export-magnification effect helps explain the substantial increase in world trade in
the two decades preceding the global downturn of 2008-09. Between 1980 and 2007, trade
volumes of goods and services increased at an average annual rate of 5.9%, according to IMF
data. Growth in real GDP was significantly lower: at 2.9% using market exchange rates and
at 3.4% using PPP weights. As a result, the trade-to-GDP ratio jumped from 14% to 27% (in
nominal terms). Standard trade models have difficulties replicating the expansion of world
trade based on reasonable trade elasticities. Yi (2003) partly resolved this puzzle by allowing
for multiple border-crossings of intermediate goods. In his homogeneous-firm setup, the re-
sponsiveness of total trade to changes in trade costs rises with the number of border-crossings
and the trade response can be non-linear. Hence, the reduction in trade costs needed to ex-
plain the overall surge in trade is lower in the case of vertical fragmentation of production.
The export-magnification effect developed in this paper provides a complementary expla-
nation for the growth in world trade over the last two decades: The gradual decline in off-
shoring costs over this period triggered a "Darwinian evolution" that gave rise to a realloca-
tion of market shares from local low-productivity firms to foreign high-productivity exporters.
This process stimulated not only trade in intermediates but also trade in differentiated final
goods. Notably, the export-magnification effect of offshoring does not rely on statistical arte-
facts related to the measurement of trade. Rather, it provides a purely "economic" explanation
grounded in the profit maximizing behavior of heterogeneous firms.
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Impacts on revenues, profits and aggregate welfare
Lower variable offshoring costs also have repercussions on the revenues and profits of indi-
vidual firms and aggregate welfare. In brief, we find:
Result 3: The intra-industry reallocation raises aggregate welfare
A marginal drop in variable offshoring costs (τI) leads to an intra-industry reallocation of mar-
ket share and resources towards the more productive firms. The associated increase in average
firm efficiency raises real wages and, thereby, aggregate welfare.
To see this, note that all incumbent offshoring firms - i.e. firms with relatively high pro-
ductivity - see their domestic revenues rise:
r′H(φ
off )
rH(φoff )
=
r′F (φ
off )
rF (φoff )
> 1. (24)
At the same time, they benefit from higher export sales. For new exporters this is trivial, for
seasoned exporters it follows from equation (23). Of course, variable profits increase in tan-
dem, as they are proportional to revenues. Hence, all incumbent offshoring firms unequivo-
cally benefit from lower offshoring costs.
By contrast, it is unclear whether the firms switching from domestic to foreign sourcing see
their profits rise or fall. On the one hand, their domestic revenues rise. On the other hand, they
now have to bear the fixed costs of offshoring. That said, each of these new offshoring firms
realizes higher profits compared to a hypothetical case in which they refrain from offshoring.
Low-productivity firms who continue to purchase domestic intermediates have to digest a
fall in revenues and profits. Increased competition squeezes their market share, whereas their
input costs remain unchanged. Therefore, the least productive of these firms have to leave the
market.
Overall, the marginal fall in offshoring costs leads to an intra-industry reallocation of mar-
ket share and resources towards the more productive firms. As a result, the average firm ef-
ficiency is higher in the new equilibrium. The consumer price index falls, resulting in higher
real wages. Thus, welfare unequivocally rises in all advanced economies. While it is not clear
whether the product variety available increases (because the number of additional foreign ex-
porters could be smaller than the number of domestic firms leaving the market), this variety-
effect is always dominated by the effect of lower average prices (see equation 17). As already
indicated, welfare in the workbench country W is tied to labor productivity in the Y sector
and therefore not affected by the change in offshoring costs.
Inter-industry reallocation
The fall in offshoring costs not only leads to adjustments within the differentiated good sector
but also triggers a reallocation of resources between sectors. Since trade must be balanced, the
additional demand for imported intermediates requires an expansion of Home’s output and
exports in its comparative advantage sector Y . Hence labor is reallocated from the domestic
intermediate good sector to the homogeneous final good sector Y . The additional output
units of Y are traded for intermediates from country W . In other words:
Result 4: Inter-industry trade also intensifies
A marginal drop in variable offshoring costs (τI) also intensifies inter-industry trade between
the advanced economies and the workbench country.
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This effect comes on top of the export-magnification effect of offshoring. It should be
noted, however, that the efficiency gain associated with this inter-industry reallocation of pro-
duction raises domestic welfare only indirectly, by allowing the differentiated good sector to
expand (recall that pY = 1).
3.2 Other comparative statics
One might expect that the impacts of a change in fixed offshoring costs (fI) are very similar
to those for variable offshoring costs. However, a drop in fixed offshoring costs actually raises
the minimum productivity cut-off level necessary to become a successful exporter (ϕ̂ex,off )
(see appendix A.4). Hence, some incumbent exporters are forced to stop selling their goods
abroad. The reason is that, on the one hand, competition abroad intensifies, as some foreign
firms engage in offshoring for the first time and thereby improve their competitiveness. On
the other hand, the marginal domestic firm that is indifferent between exporting and staying
at home is assumed to be already engaged in offshoring. Hence, a decline in fixed offshoring
costs has no impact on its marginal costs. As a result, exporting becomes unprofitable for
the marginal exporter. (By contrast, variable offshoring costs enter the marginal costs and
therefore affect foreign sales prospects.)
The results so far have shown that changes in variable offshoring costs have important
consequences for the firms’ export decision. However, the converse is also true, i.e. changes
in parameters related to final goods trade also affect the firms’ offshoring decision. In fact,
both a decrease in the variable cost of trading final goods (τ ) and a drop in the correspond-
ing fixed costs (fex) raise the cutoff productivity for offshoring firms, ϕ̂off (see appendix A.4).
In fact, the weakest firms that previously engaged in offshoring are hurt by the deflection of
demand toward foreign exporters and have to switch to domestic sourcing. Interestingly, the
intensification of competition stems entirely from the entry of new foreign exporters. In con-
trast, changes in offshoring costs also stiffen competition through a second channel, namely
the boost in competitiveness of all domestic firms who are able to offshore (see Section 3.1).
This channel is absent here, since lower trade costs do not affect the marginal cost of pro-
ducing for the home market. Finally, it is worth noting that our results are fully consistent
with Melitz (2003). Hence, qualitatively, changes in the parameters related to trade in final
goods (τ , fex and n) have the same consequences on the minimum cutoff productivity and
the exporting threshold as in the Melitz model.
4 Conclusions
World trade drastically increased in the two decades preceding the global downturn of 2008-
09. Based on a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, we argue that the surge
in world trade can be partly explained by the export-magnification effect of offshoring. As
barriers to offshoring decreased over time, more and more firms were able to cut produc-
tion costs by relocating some production stages to low-wage countries and the input costs of
incumbent offshoring firms decreased. This improvement in price competitiveness allowed
them to ramp up their exports (intensive margin) or to become exporters for the first time
(extensive margin). As a result, international trade in differentiated final goods intensified.
Crucially, the export-magnification effect reflects a reallocation of market shares towards the
high-productivity firms, since only these firms are able to bear the fixed costs associated with
offshoring and exporting. Of course, this explanation of the expansion of world trade over the
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last two decades should be seen as complementary to other approaches, particularly the one
by Yi (2003).
Our results also have implications for the longer-term prospects of global trade. In princi-
ple, the export-magnification effect can be seen as a one-off shift in trade levels: A marginal
reduction in offshoring costs will push the economy into a new equilibrium characterized by
higher trade flows than in the initial equilibrium. If, however, the gradual decline in offshoring
costs continues in the years ahead, the export-magnification effect will provide a steady boost
to world trade in the future. Further reductions in offshoring costs could stem from, among
other factors, advances in transportation and telecommunication technology that facilitate
the monitoring and coordination of distant production activities.
Finally, we see several promising avenues for future research in this field. First, it would be
interesting to build a similar model featuring offshoring between advanced economies. Em-
pirically, similar countries tend to trade intermediates heavily among each other (Grossman
& Rossi-Hansberg 2008a). Second, the model could be extended to allow for asymmetries
across the advanced economies, particularly as regards the productivity distributions in the
differentiated good sector. This would open up the possibility that domestic exporters im-
prove their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign exporters, too, rather than only vis-à-vis foreign
non-offshoring, non-exporting firms.
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A Appendices
A.1 Ranking of cutoff productivity levels
We have assumed the following ranking of productivity cutoff levels: ϕ̂min < ϕ̂off < ϕ̂ex,off .
This appendix demonstrates that assumption (A.1)-(A.3) indeed ensure that this ranking holds.
To start with, notice that
ϕ̂min < ϕ̂off ⇔ p
off
I
pdI
>
(
fp
fI + fp
) 1
α(σ−1)
≡ p˜1
ϕ̂off < ϕ̂ex,off ⇔ p
off
I
pdI
<
(
1− fI
fexτσ−1
) 1
α(σ−1)
≡ p˜2.
Assumption (A.3) ensures that p˜1 < p˜2 < 1. Thus, the ordering ϕ̂min < ϕ̂off < ϕ̂ex,off
holds if
p˜1 <
poffI
pdI
< p˜2 < 1. (A-1)
In words, if the relative price of intermediates is neither too large nor too small, then the cutoff
productivity levels will be ordered as described in the main text.
In principle, firms could also opt for a fourth strategy, i.e. exporting without offshoring.
However, under assumptions (A.1)-(A.3), this strategy is always dominated by another strat-
egy. The derivation of this result is relatively straightforward and therefore omitted.
A.2 Aggregation
In equilibrium, the X sector hosts three kinds of firms. Let M denote the equilibrium mass
of incumbent firms in this sector. Then the mass of all domestic firms that neither export
nor offshore is given by Md = νdM . Furthermore, the mass of incumbent offshoring firms is
Moff = νoffM and the mass of domestic exporters Mex,off = νex,offM . Finally, the mass of
all firms serving the domestic market, including foreign exporters, is Mt = M + nMex,off .
Let φ˜d be the average efficiency of all domestic firms that neither export nor engage in off-
shoring. Analogously, φ˜off stands for the average efficiency of all domestic firms that purchase
foreign intermediates without exporting and φ˜ex,off for the average efficicency of all domestic
exporters who also engage in offshoring. More specifically:
φ˜d =
 1G(ϕ̂off )−G(ϕ̂min)
∫ ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
[
ϕ(
pdI
)α
]σ−1
g(ϕ) dϕ

1
σ−1
φ˜off =
 1G(ϕ̂ex,off )−G(ϕ̂off )
∫ ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂off
 ϕ(
poffI
)α
σ−1 g(ϕ) dϕ

1
σ−1
φ˜ex,off =
 11−G(ϕ̂ex,off )
∫ ∞
ϕ̂ex,off
 ϕ(
poffI
)α
σ−1 g(ϕ) dϕ

1
σ−1
.
15
Notice that all cross-firm efficiency averages depend on the productivity cutoff levels. Since
these cutoffs are functions of ϕ̂min, the same is true for the averages. In particular:
φ˜t = φ̂min
[
rH(φ˜t)
rH(φ̂min)
] 1
σ−1
=
ϕ̂min
(pdI)α
(
βL
Mtσfp
) 1
σ−1
.
A.3 Open Economy Equilibrium
This appendix proves that the zero cutoff profit (ZCP) condition and the free entry (FE) con-
dition together identify a unique cutoff level ϕ̂min, as in Melitz (2003).
To start with, recall that the ZCP and FE conditions together imply:
few =[G(ϕ̂off )−G(ϕ̂min)]pi(φ˜d) + [G(ϕ̂ex,off )−G(ϕ̂off )]pi(φ˜off )
+ [1−G(ϕ̂ex,off )]pi(φ˜ex,off ).
(A-2)
Average profits of the three groups of firms occuring in equilibrium are given by:
pi(φ˜d) =
[(
φ˜d
φ̂min
)σ−1
− 1
]
fpw
pi(φ˜off ) =
[(
φ˜off
φ̂min
)σ−1
− 1
]
fpw +
[(
φ˜off
φ̂off
)σ−1
− 1
]
fIw
pi(φ˜ex,off ) =
[(
φ˜ex,off
φ̂min
)σ−1
− 1
]
fpw +
[(
φ˜ex,off
φ̂off
)σ−1
− 1
]
fIw
+
[(
φ˜ex,off
φ̂ex,off
)σ−1
− 1
]
nfexw
To condensate equation (A-2), we define two auxiliary functions:
U(ϕ′, ϕ′′) =
∫ ϕ′′
ϕ′
(
ζ
(pI(ζ)α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ
V (ϕ′, ϕ′′) = G(ϕ′′)−G(ϕ′).
For instance, the average profit of all firms that neither export nor engage in offshoring -
weighted by νdνin - can be expressed as:
[G(ϕ̂off )−G(ϕ̂min)]pi(φ˜d) =
[
(φ̂min)1−σU(ϕ̂min, ϕ̂off )− V (ϕ̂min, ϕ̂off )
]
fpw.
Now, noting thatV (ϕ′, ϕ′′)+V (ϕ′′, ϕ′′′) = V (ϕ′, ϕ′′′) andU(ϕ′, ϕ′′)+U(ϕ′′, ϕ′′′) = U(ϕ′, ϕ′′′),
we recast equation (A-2):
fe =
[
(φ̂min)σ−1U(ϕ̂min,∞)− V (ϕ̂min,∞)
]
fp +
[
(φ̂off )1−σU(ϕ̂off ,∞)− V (ϕ̂off ,∞)
]
fI
+
[
(φ̂ex,off )1−σU(ϕ̂ex,off ,∞)− V (ϕ̂ex,off ,∞)
]
nfex.
(A-3)
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To boil down the preceding equation even further, we define:
j(ϕ) = φ(ϕ)1−σU(ϕ,∞)− V (ϕ,∞)
= [1−G(ϕ)]
( φ˜(ϕ)
φ(ϕ)
)σ−1
− 1
 = [1−G(ϕ)]k(ϕ).
Here,
φ˜(ϕ)σ−1 =
1
1−G(ϕ)
∫ ∞
ϕ
(
ζ
(pI(ζ)α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ
k(ϕ) = φ(ϕ)1−σφ˜(ϕ)σ−1 − 1.
It is now straightforward to show that equation (A-3) can be rewritten as follows:
fpj(ϕ̂min) + fIj(ϕ̂off ) + nfexj(ϕ̂ex,off ) = fe. (A-4)
Recall that ϕ̂off and ϕ̂ex,off are implicitly defined as functions of ϕ̂min by equations (12) and
(14).
It is now straightforward to show that equation (A-4) identifies a unique cutoff level ϕ̂min
and that the ZCP curve cuts the FE curve from above in (ϕ, pi) space. In fact, the proof is
analogous to Melitz (2003) and therefore omitted. One should keep in mind, however, that
the ZCP curve has a discontinuity at ϕ = ϕ̂off (see Figure 3). At this point, φ(ϕ) switches from
ϕ/(pdI)
α to ϕ/(poffI )
α. That said, our assumptions ensure that the equilibrium ϕ̂min, i.e. the
intersection of the ZCP and FE curves, is strictly to the left of this discontinuity, in the range
(0, ϕ̂off ). In this subset j(ϕ), and therefore the ZCP curve, are continuous.
Having identified ϕ̂min, equations (12) and (14) determine the remaining cutoff levels ϕ̂off
and ϕ̂ex,off . All other endogenous variables can be expressed as functions of these three cutoff
levels.
A.4 Comparative Statics
In this appendix, we derive analytically the comparative statics described in Section 3.
A.4.1 Lower τI
Differentiating equation (A-4) with respect to τI yields:
d ϕ̂min
d τI
= −αϕ̂min
τI pˆ
fIj
′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off pˆ
fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + fpj′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
< 0
Here, pˆ ≡ 1− (poffI /pdI)α(σ−1) < 1.
Since d ϕ̂min/ d τI > −αϕ̂min/(τI pˆ), we have:
d ϕ̂off
d τI
=
αϕ̂off
τI pˆ
+
ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
∂ϕ̂min
∂τI
> 0.
Hence the direct effect of a decrease in τI on ϕ̂off dominates the indirect effect operating
through ϕ̂min. Similarly, since d ϕ̂min/ d τI > −αϕ̂min/τI :
∂ϕ̂ex,off
∂τI
=
αϕ̂ex,off
τI
+
ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂min
∂ϕ̂min
∂τI
> 0. (A-5)
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To verify this, notice that d ϕ̂min/d τI > −αϕ̂min/τI can be rewritten as follows:
pˆ−1 − 1 < fpj
′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min
fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off
<
fp
fI
∫∞
ϕ̂min
(
ζ
pI (ζ)
α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ∫∞
ϕ̂off
(
ζ
pI (ζ)
α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ
(
φ(ϕ̂off )
φ(ϕ̂min)
)σ−1
.
Using equation (12) and the definition of pˆ above, we arrive at:
poffI
pdI
<

∫∞
ϕ̂min
(
ζ
pI (ζ)
α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ∫∞
ϕ̂off
(
ζ
pI (ζ)
α
)σ−1
g(ζ) d ζ

1
α(σ−1)
.
Under assumption (A.1), this condition always holds, since the right-hand side is greater than
one.
A.4.2 Lower fI
d ϕ̂min
d fI
=
ϕ̂min [1−G(ϕ̂off )]
fpj′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min + fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
< 0
Since d ϕ̂min/ d fI > −ϕ̂min/[(σ − 1)fI ]:
d ϕ̂off
d fI
=
ϕ̂off
(σ − 1)fI +
ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d fI
> 0
d ϕ̂ex,off
d fI
=
ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d fI
< 0
A.4.3 Lower τ
d ϕ̂min
d τ
= − ϕ̂min
τ
nfexj
′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
fpj′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min + fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
< 0
d ϕ̂off
d τ
=
ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d τ
< 0
Since d ϕ̂min/ d τ > −ϕ̂min/τ :
d ϕ̂ex,off
d τ
=
ϕ̂ex,off
τ
+
ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d τ
> 0
A.4.4 Lower fex
d ϕ̂min
d fex
=
ϕ̂minn [1−G(ϕ̂ex,off )]
fpj′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min + fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
< 0
d ϕ̂off
d fex
=
ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d fex
< 0
Since d ϕ̂min/ d fex > −ϕ̂min/[(σ − 1)fex]:
d ϕ̂ex,off
d fex
=
ϕ̂ex,off
(σ − 1)fex +
ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
d fex
> 0
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A.4.5 Higher n
d ϕ̂min
dn
= − fexj(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂min
fpj′(ϕ̂min)ϕ̂min + fIj′(ϕ̂off )ϕ̂off + nfexj′(ϕ̂ex,off )ϕ̂ex,off
> 0
d ϕ̂off
dn
=
ϕ̂off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
dn
> 0
d ϕ̂ex,off
dn
=
ϕ̂ex,off
ϕ̂min
d ϕ̂min
dn
> 0
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Figure 1: Extra-euro area export volumes of goods by Broad Economic Categories (indices,
March 2000=100; 3-month moving average)
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Figure 2: Extra-euro area import volumes of goods by Broad Economic Categories (indices,
March 2000=100; 3-month moving average)
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Figure 3: Open economy equilibrium
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